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Abstract
The Federal Aviation Administration emphasized the need to focus on and develop human factors training as early as 1993 in official
Human Factors Policy Order 9550.8. The purpose of this study was to conduct a detailed qualitative phenomenological analysis of the risk
perceptions and decision-making model of collegiate aviation pilots for unstabilized approaches. The study focused on understanding how
collegiate aviation pilots perceive unstable approaches, the risk associated with unstable approaches, and the factors that trigger pilots to
execute a go-around. The International Air Transportation Association warns that continuing an unstabilized approach can lead to runway
excursions, hard landings causing damage to aircraft, or even controlled flight into terrain. The theoretical framework guiding this study
was the risk compensation theory. The researchers recruited 15 participants through purposeful sampling for a phenomenological analysis
using semi-structured interviews and a short questionnaire. A phenomenological methodology enabled the researchers to bring forth into
consciousness preconceived ideas about unstabilized approaches and then set them aside. To address the research questions, information
collected from individual interviews was analyzed and triangulated using a qualitative questionnaire. Three major themes emerged from
the data: (a) effect of internal perceptions, (b) external pressures, and (c) unique worldviews. The findings validated the risk compensation
theory’s principles by exposing the influence of mental and environmental factors impairing participants’ judgment of an unstabilized
approach. Further research is required for developing standardized and objective stabilization criteria that the general aviation community
can accept.
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Introduction
Human factors research has been considered a vital component to continuously improve aviation safety in the United States.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) identified the need to invest in human factors to improve safety and published its
official Human Factors Policy Order 9550.8 (FAA, 1993). The Human Factors Policy Order 9550.8 emphasized the need for
‘‘incorporating and coordinating human factors considerations’’ in the research and development, programs, and activities that
were focused on enhancing ‘‘aviation safety, efficiency, and productivity’’ (FAA, 1993, p. 1). The FAA emphasized the need
for human factors research to analyze existing systems and identify threats that could be mitigated through research,
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development, and engineering (FAA, 1993). With growing
air traffic and the expansion of the general aviation industry,
there is a growing need for research that is focused on human
factors in general aviation pilots.
The purpose of this study is to conduct a detailed qualitative phenomenological analysis of the risk perceptions
and decision-making model of collegiate aviation pilots for
unstabilized approaches. The study focuses on understanding how collegiate aviation pilots perceive unstable
approaches, the risk associated with unstable approaches,
and the factors that trigger pilots to execute a go-around.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU), Daytona
Beach Campus, was the research site used to collect the
data. This research study was sponsored by the ERAU
College of Aviation Philanthropy Council.
Statement of the Problem
Unstabilized approaches pose a major risk for pilots. The
International Air Transportation Association (IATA) warns
that continuing an unstabilized approach can lead to runway
excursions, hard landings causing damage to aircraft, or even
controlled flight into terrain (IATA, 2016). The Flight Safety
Foundation’s International Advisory Committee (IAC)
explained that often pilots did execute go-arounds in spite
of flying an unstable approach to landing below the stable
approach height as mandated by the standard operating
procedures of the operator they were flying for (Blajev &
Curtis, 2017). This discussion, initiated by the IAC, led the
Flight Safety Foundation to invest in research and development that focused on the unwillingness of pilots to execute
go-around maneuvers despite flying unstable approaches.
There is a need for further research on the risk perception of
pilots and the unwillingness to go-around. While significant
research has been conducted on risk perception and
unstabilized approaches for commercial and airline pilots,
there is a significant research gap on understanding risk
perception and unwillingness to go-around for general
aviation pilots. Collegiate flight training programs are
significant stakeholders in the general aviation community
that provide flight training to students that are likely to seek a
career in commercial or airline flying. This study will utilize
collegiate aviation pilots for the analysis. The research
questions guiding this study are:

N How do collegiate aviation pilots perceive risks
associated with unstable approaches?

N What factors contribute to unstable approaches as
perceived by collegiate aviation pilots?

risk associated with unstable approaches based on their
lived experiences. The results of this study are significant to
human factors researchers and specialists, the FAA, flight
training organizations, and other stakeholders of the
National Airspace System. This study aims to bridge the
research gap on understanding risk perception and
decision-making of general aviation pilots. While the
general aviation pilot population is extremely diverse,
collegiate flight training programs are significant stakeholders in the general aviation community that train
students that are likely to seek a career as professional
pilots. While this study’s results will be specific to the
collegiate aviation pilot population, this study’s data can be
utilized to develop a literature foundation for further
research on the larger general aviation population. Flight
training organizations and flight instructors can also use
this study’s data to modify or create instructional material.
Literature Review
Human error is a major component of aviation accidents,
and 70–80% of accidents are caused by some human error
(Wiegmann & Shapell, 2003). Gong et al. (2014) analyzed
the role of human factors in aviation accidents and
proposed an integrated graphic–taxonomic–associative
approach to analyzing aviation accidents, and identified
human factors as ‘‘critical causes of modern aviation
accidents’’ (Gong et al., 2014, p. 1). The proposed accident
analysis approach highlighted the role of human factors in
analyzing and identifying unsafe factors that led to
accidents.
Unstable Approaches
The approach phase of a flight is a safety-critical
component of every flight. The IATA stated that 65% of
all commercial aircraft accidents from 2011 to 2015
occurred during the flight approach (IATA, 2016). For
accidents recorded from 2011 to2015, an unstable approach
was analyzed as a factor for 14% of the accidents. The
IATA stated that poorly executed approaches and a failure
to execute go-arounds are contributory factors to many
accidents in commercial aviation. Similar to the findings
of IATA (2016), the FAA Aviation Safety Team
(FAASTeam) published a fact sheet on stabilized approach
and landings that emphasized the need for establishing and
maintaining a stable approach to reduce the risk of loss-ofcontrol accidents. The FAA stated the need for a pilot to
maintain the judgment of visual cues to maintain a stable
approach (FAASTeam, n.d.).

Significance of the Study
Stable Approach Concept
Increasing safety in aviation is of interest to all
stakeholders in the National Airspace System. This study
focuses on collegiate aviation pilots and their perception of

The FAA has published a standard stable approach
concept in Chapter 8 of the Airplane Flying Handbook
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(FAA, 2016). The FAA states that the pilot must establish
and maintain a ‘‘constant angle glide path towards a
predetermined point on the landing runway’’ (FAA, 2016,
p. 8-9). The FAA emphasizes the need for a constant rate
of descent and constant airspeed on final approach.
Additionally, the FAA emphasizes the need to adopt an
‘‘aiming point’’ and the visual references for a pilot to
judge a stabilized approach (FAA, 2016, p. 8-9). The FAA
also emphasized the need for a go-around when a stable
approach cannot be executed. The FAA advised instructor
pilots to communicate the idea that a go-around can be
executed at any time during the approach to the landing
phase.
The FAA identifies two major factors that inhibit pilots
from continuing an unstable approach and not executing a
go-around maneuver (FAA, 2016). Landing expectancy or
set is defined as the ‘‘anticipatory belief that conditions
are not as threatening as they are and that the approach
is surely terminated with a safe landing’’ (FAA, 2016,
p. 8-13). The concept of landing expectancy is also
discussed by Cox (2015) in an article titled ‘‘Go-around:
The sooner, the better.’’ The concept of landing expectancy
explains that a pilot executing an unstable approach might
be aware that the approach is unstable, but an inherent bias
or belief tends the pilot to believe that the threats associated
are not worthy of executing a go-around and that a safe
landing can be executed (Cox, 2015). There is a lack of
literature that explains the factors that increase the tendency
of a pilot to exhibit landing expectancies, such as flight
experience, age, gender, or cultural background. However,
landing expectancy is an important human factors concept
as it explains that even though a pilot might be aware that
the approach is unstabilized, they might continue the
approach and not execute a go-around by either ignoring
the risks or downsizing them.
The second factor identified by the FAA that inhibits a
pilot from executing a go-around is pride. The FAA defines
pride as ‘‘the mistaken belief that the act of going around is
an admission of failure—failure to execute the approach
properly’’ (FAA, 2016, p. 8-13). Pilots may perceive
executing a go-around as an act of failure or delegitimizing
their proficiency as a pilot. There is a lack of literature on
the factors that increase a pilot’s likelihood of exhibiting
pride, such as age, flight experience, gender, or cultural
background.
The Flight Safety Foundation published an Approach
and Landing Accident Reduction Briefing Note 7.1 that
focused on the concept of stabilized approaches. The Flight
Safety Foundation (2009) explained some of the factors
that lead to unstabilized approaches. Pilot fatigue, psychological pressures, automation dependency, visual illusions,
and air traffic control instructions were identified as some
factors that lead to unstable approaches. Additionally, the
Flight Safety Foundation stated that ‘‘belief that the aircraft
will be stabilized at the minimum stabilization height’’ and
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‘‘excessive confidence by the PNF/PM [pilot monitoring]
that the P.F. [pilot flying] will achieve a timely stabilization’’ were two factors leading to unstabilized approaches
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2009, p. 2).
Psychological Factors Preventing Pilots from Executing
Go-Around Maneuvers
Research suggests that pilots’ hesitancy to execute goaround is rooted in psychological factors. Blajev and Curtis
(2017) analyzed ‘‘the psychology of non-compliance’’
(p. 3). Blajev and Curtis (2017) stated that pilots consider
executing the go-around maneuver as risky due to the lack
of experience of executing go-arounds and the go-around
maneuver is a rare maneuver for many pilots, which gives
rise to fear for executing the maneuver. Blajev and Curtis
(2017) recommended that the definition of a stable
approach be updated with more objective parameters.
Furthermore, it is important to develop and enhance the
decision-making criteria used to assess a stable approach
and that ‘‘decision making is viable beyond the defined
approach phase’’ (Blajev & Curtis, 2017, p. 4). There is
also a need for further research on developing pilots’
situation awareness that influences decision-making during
an approach. The findings of the report suggested that a
pilot’s behavior and actions are functions of a decisionmaking process which is influenced by various external and
internal factors and that situation awareness plays a key
role in influencing the way pilots perceive these factors.
The external and internal factors also influence a pilot’s
perception of risk and risk tolerance (Blajev & Curtis,
2017).
Similar to the approach taken by Blajev and Curtis
(2017), Lai et al. (2019) studied unstable approaches in
aviation from the perspective of shared mental models of
pilots. Lai et al. (2019) focused on pilots’ decision-making
and performance that lead to continuing unstabilized
approaches and not executing go-around maneuvers. Lai
et al. (2019) studied the role of increased workload on the
pilot, leading to impaired decision-making during an
approach. Lai et al. (2019) also focused on the role
of continuation bias, which is a form of cognitive bias
that leads a pilot into continuing an unstable approach.
Cognitive bias occurs when ‘‘human cognition reliably
produces representations that are systematically distorted
compared to some aspect of objective reality’’ (Fong et al.,
2017, p. 1). It can quite simply be described as a systematic
error in thinking and judgment that affects the decisions
humans make. Cognitive bias is a ‘‘pattern’’ where humans
selectively process information presented (Kuckertz &
Amir, 2017, p. 1). Elston (2019) explains cognitive bias as
a sophisticated filter developed by the brain that allows us
to focus on information that our brain perceives to be
important to us and dampen input that we do not perceive
to be important.
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Situation Awareness and Unstable Approaches
Situation awareness of a pilot influences their perception
of threats and risks during all phases of flight. The FAA
(2016) discusses the role of situation awareness in the
Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge. The FAA
describes situation awareness as ‘‘the accurate perception
and understanding of all the factors and conditions within
the five fundamental risk elements (flight, pilot, aircraft,
environment, and type of operation that comprise any given
aviation situation)’’ (FAA, 2016, p. 2-24). The FAA states
that the concepts of aeronautical decision making (ADM),
single-pilot resource management, and situation awareness
are linked as they are key influencers of a pilot’s perception
and ability to manage risks (FAA, 2016). Some other
factors that influence a pilot’s ability to manage resources
and maintain safety are task management, risk management, and automation management. Some obstacles to
maintaining situation awareness include fatigue, stress,
distractions, and task saturations (FAA, 2016). During the
approach phase of flight, a pilot is likely to be fatigued
as the approach and landing are executed at the end of
the flight. A fatigued pilot is likely to lose situation
awareness that will affect the pilot’s decision-making
process and risk perception. A pilot is most likely to be
task-saturated when faced with a workload that is beyond
psychological or physiological capabilities at a point in
time. During an approach and landing, a single pilot
might be looking out for traffic, maintaining visual
contact with the runway environment, contacting air
traffic control, tuning in radio frequencies, and operating
the aircraft in a busy airspace. This phase of flight
presents a high workload, which can alter a pilot’s
resource management and decision-making.
The FAA states that situation awareness ‘‘enables the
pilot to assess and manage risk and make accurate and
timely decisions’’ (FAA, n.d.). The FAASTeam emphasizes the need for sufficient ADM skills to maintain
situation awareness. The FAASTeam states that ‘‘understanding the decision-making process provides a foundation for developing the necessary ADM skills’’ (FAA,
n.d., p. 1). The pilot’s ADM skills and risk perception
influence the decision-making model of the pilot. Some of
the processes involved in decision-making are defining
the problem, choosing a course of action, and assessing
the risk elements of a situation. O’Brien and O’Hare
(2007) studied the role of situation awareness ability in
successful performance by human beings at dynamic realworld tasks. O’Brien and O’Hare (2007) stated that
perception, memory, attention, and executive control are
abilities that underline the attainment of situation awareness, which impacts a person’s performance in dynamic
environments. O’Brien and O’Hare’s statements are
extended from the work of Endsley (1988) on situation
awareness, who proposed a hierarchical model of situation
awareness.

Risk Perception
The FAA states that hazards and risks are ‘‘two defining
elements’’ of ADM (FAA, 2016, p. 2-4). The FAA Risk
Management Handbook defines a hazard as ‘‘a hazard is a
present condition, event, object, or circumstance that could
lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired event
such as an accident’’ (FAA, 2009, p. 1-2). The FAA defines
risk as ‘‘the future impact of a hazard that is not controlled
or eliminated’’ (FAA, 2009, p. 1-5). An important
component of aviation safety is identifying hazards and
managing risks.
Risks from a hazard can be perceived differently by
people. Risk perception is a personal process that differs
from person to person (Brown, 2014). The risk perception
process is influenced by a person’s surroundings, mental
state, and personal background amongst a range of other
factors (Brown, 2014). The perception of risk is subjective
as the same hazard can be interpreted differently by
different people at different times and places (Ropeik,
2012). An effect of this subjectivity is the ‘‘risk perception
gap’’ which is the ‘‘gap between our fears and the
evidence’’ (Ropeik, 2012, p. 1). Humans might tend to
either upsize or downsize a threat that might not be
consistent with the evidence that might be present
regarding the severity of a present hazard. This risk
perception gap arises because risk perception is largely an
‘‘unconscious emotional process’’ (Brown, 2014, p. A277).
This gap leads to humans forming decisions based on the
perception gaps that can influence the decision-making
process. Ropeik (2012) explains that it is important to
understand how an individual perceives risk and the
perception gap formed. The understanding of the perception gap is important ‘‘to recognize the dangers that can
arise when we sometimes get risk wrong, and in order that
we may more wisely manage those risks’’ (Ropeik, 2012,
p. 1). Wachinger et al. (2013) stated that it is important to
analyze the process of humans perceiving risks because the
perception of risk is different from the perception of other
real phenomena such as sight and sound, as humans do not
fundamentally use sense organs for risk perception. Risk
perception is an internal process through ‘‘mental models’’
that a person utilizes to ‘‘judge risks’’ (Wachinger et al.,
2013, p. 1049). These mental models are influenced by
cultural backgrounds, learning, and experience, amongst a
range of other factors. Additionally, these mental models
utilized to judge risks are ‘‘constantly moderated’’ which
can include reinforcement, modifications, amplification, or
attenuation (Wachinger et al., 2013, p. 1049). These mental
models affect the perception of risk, which can differ for
different types of risks, the context in which the risk is
presented, and the social understanding and background of
the person. Wachinger et al. (2013) explained the role of
risk perception in the actions a person takes as risk
perception is influenced by past experiences, information
received from stimuli, and possible external pressures and
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peer pressure. Additionally, the perception of risk can also
be affected by ‘‘intervening variables’’ such as a person’s
ability to handle a particular situation, economic conditions, and trust and responsibility (Wachinger et al., 2013,
p. 1054). The risk perception has a direct effect on the
‘‘preparedness’’ and ‘‘willingness to act’’ which leads to a
person’s actions (Wachinger et al., 2013, p. 1054).
Implications of Risk Perception on Unstable Approaches
The literature review has focused on factors identified
by previous scholarly studies that lead to an unstabilized
approach with a focus on the psychological factors that
affect a pilot’s decision or noncompliance to stable
approach criteria. Blajev and Curtis (2017) addressed the
concerns of pilot unwillingness to execute go-around
maneuvers with a variety of reasons, which included lack
of situation awareness and the role of risk perception.
The Flight Safety Foundation’s analysis corresponded to
the phenomenon of landing expectancy that the FAA has
illustrated in the Airplane Flying Handbook. Literature
concerning situation awareness and risk perception was
reviewed to gain a fundamental understanding of the
decision-making process used by human beings in dynamic
situations. The literature review revealed that the situation
awareness of a pilot has a direct effect on the way a human
perceives risk and makes decisions. Humans tend to
perceive risks differently, which is influenced by culture,
time and context, and training and experience, amongst
various other factors. The risk perception process directly
impacts the decision-making model of human beings.
The literature review addresses the role of situation
awareness and risk perception in influencing a pilot’s
decision-making during an approach. The approach phase
of a flight is a work-intensive phase of flight that external
pressures and fatigue can characterize. A pilot is exposed
to various physical stimuli outside the aircraft (visual
references) and inside the aircraft (instrumentation). A pilot
relies on these references and instrumentation to judge the
risks and make decisions.
Theoretical Framework
The theory guiding this study was the risk compensation
theory. The risk compensation theory’s roots can be traced
back to the risk homeostasis theory, which was originally
used in the mid-1800s in physiology by Bernard and then
later used by Cannon in the early 1900s (Trimpop, 1996).
The term ‘‘homeostasis’’ was initially used to define body
processes such as blood pressure, temperature, and respiration rate. The risk homeostasis theory stated that there
was a specific value for each action and, therefore, could be
described as a constant value. Consequently, the fluctuation
process between the values or the target level was referred
to as homeostasis. In 1976, Gerald Wilde formalized this
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notion by a formation of a model of driver behavior
(Trimpop, 1996). Wilde named this formation the ‘‘risk
compensation theory.’’ The theory is based on the compensating actions that are triggered by the perception of the
discrepancy between the observed and desired level of risk
(Trimpop, 1996). In other words, the theory hypothesizes
that people compare the amount of risk perceived with their
target level of risk and, in an attempt to eliminate the
discrepancy between the observed and desired level of risk,
individuals will adjust their behavior (Wilde, 1998).
The risk compensation theory has been predominantly
used in the transportation industry during the development
of safety features such as the seatbelt and the antilock
braking system. Wilde’s (1998) theory of compensation
proposes that the introduction of external safety measures
can only reduce accidents until the driver perceives the
consequences of the accident. However, Wilde’s (1998)
theory also suggested that once the driver notices the
increase in safety features, the driver will feel safer and will
adopt a riskier behavior in exchange for performance
benefits such as getting to their destination in a shorter
amount of time (Wilde, 1998). Wilde’s response to the
increase in accidents was to target the level of risk rather
than the introduction of technical solutions. Therefore, if
the perception of risk stays the same, the motivation to
change behavior will also stay the same.
Ultimately, the target level of risk will depend on the
perception of the costs, and the benefits of behavioral
alternatives of either being safe or assuming risky behavior.
Wilde (1998) believes that the target level of risk will drop
if the value of cautious behavior (incentives), and the
negative consequences of risky behavior (punishment), is
increased compared to the decrease in the benefits of risky
behavior (heroism) and the negative consequences of
cautious behavior (time loss). The lower value of the target
level will lead individuals to drive more cautiously by
reducing their speed and paying more attention to the road.
Similar to other means of transportation, the aviation
industry shares human intervention as a common denominator in the risk perception area. Pilots are susceptible to
risk compensation and in the engagement of behavioral
change due to the ability of the pilot to perceive risk. This
risk perception was evidenced by Hunter (2002) in his
study in conjunction with the U.S. Department of
Transportation and the FAA called Risk Perception and
Risk Tolerance in Aircraft Pilots. According to Hunter
(2002), pilots with a low perception of risk tend to be
involved in more hazardous events. Consequently, risk
misperception is associated with exposure to hazardous
aviation events. A higher level of pilot experience and
qualification was associated with a lower level of perceived
risk excluding student pilots who experience a lower
risk estimation in aviation. Hunter (2002) concludes that
this lower risk estimation is due to a lack of knowledge
and sufficient understanding of how to estimate risk.
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Inappropriate assessment of risk perception was also
considered by Orasanu et al. (2002) in their study called
Risk Perception: A Critical Element of Aviation Safety.
According to Orasanu et al. (2002), the error in the
assessment of risk perception reflected on the familiarity
with and experience of the threat and how the individual is
affected by potential negative consequences, how imminent
the consequences are, and the perception or sense of control
over the situation. The inappropriate assessment of risk
occurred due to a pilot’s underestimation of the risk in a
dynamically changing situation and the pilot’s estimation
of their ability to deal with the perceived risk resulting in
believing that they are more skilled or in control of the
situation (Orasanu et al., 2002). The pilots in the study
were adopting alternate plans of action when they
perceived that a particular risk was close to or beyond
their comfort zone. In other words, the pilots were
perceiving the risk and modifying the actions to reach
their desired or target level of risk. This behavior
modification validates the foundation of the risk perception and compensation theory.
Methodology
This phenomenology study aimed to understand the risk
perceptions and decision-making skills of Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University students in training related to
judging unstabilized approaches based on their lived
experiences.
Participation
All participants, at the time of this study, were
matriculated to Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University’s
Daytona Beach residential campus to earn their bachelor’s
degree. Ten of the 15 participants were in the aeronautical
science program, while the other five were in the aeronautics program. Twelve participants had plans of pursuing

an airline pilot career, while the other three hoped to pursue
an aviation career in the private sector. The participants
were required to be at least 18 years old and possess a
private pilot, commercial pilot, or flight instructor certificate. The researchers interviewed a total of 15 participants,
five of which were private pilots, five were commercial
pilots, and five were flight instructors. The purpose of
such a sampling strategy was to gather data from a wide
spectrum of flight experience that is available in a
collegiate flight program. The samples (private pilots to
flight instructors) were expected to have sufficient prior
knowledge on stabilized approaches and the aircraft
procedures (Cessna 172 Skyhawk) that were simulated in
the study. The participants’ demographics and pseudonyms
are shown in Table 1.
Scenarios and Questions
The three approach scenarios utilized for this study were
recorded on a RedBird Advanced Aviation Training Device
for a Cessna 172 Skyhawk Nav III. The Cessna 172
Skyhawk was the same aircraft used by the participants for
the single-engine flight training at the university and the
participants were expected to be familiar with basic
operating characteristics of the aircraft and indications on
the Primary Flight Display. The interviews for the study
were conducted through the Zoom video conference
application due to Covid-19 and associated Institutional
Review Board protocols of the university. The recordings
of the scenarios were played during the virtual interviews.
The participants were asked a total of 15 open-ended
questions for the interview.
Scenario 1
The aircraft is approaching Runway 16 at Daytona
Beach International Airport (KDAB). The aircraft is at
1000 feet above ground level (AGL) and is stabilized at
the prescribed approach speed for the aircraft (65 knots).

Table 1
Participant demographics (pseudonyms)
Pseudonym

Age

Ethnicity

Academic-level degree

Alex
Thomas
Christopher
Michelle
Patrick
Mikaela
Carolina
Andrew
Janet
Bobby
Mike
Billy
Hunter
Jessica
Colin

19
23
21
19
22
19
21
22
22
20
19
21
20
25
23

White
White
Asian
White
Asian
White
Hispanic
White
White
Asian
White
White
White
Asian
Asian

Sophomore Aeronautical Science, BS
Senior Aeronautical Science, BS
Senior Aeronautical Science, BS
Freshman Aeronautical Science, BS
Masters Aeronautics, MS
Freshman Aeronautical Science, BS
Senior Aeronautical Science, BS
Senior Aeronautical Science, BS
Senior Aeronautical Science, BS
Junior Aeronautical Science, BS
Sophomore Aeronautical Science, BS
Junior Aeronautical Science, BS
Sophomore Aeronautical Science, BS
Masters Aeronautics, MS
Masters Business Administration
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The pilot inadvertently starts pitching the aircraft up
without appropriate change in power. The aircraft’s speed
starts slowing down to 55 knots at around 300 feet AGL.
1) Based on your lived experiences, how would you
determine your go-around decision?
Follow-up: Explain in detail your thought process (e.g.,
altitude, etc.)
2) What risks do you perceive if one were to continue the
approach?
3) Describe the factors that influenced your decisionmaking to command a go-around.
Scenario 2
The aircraft is approaching Runway 16 at KDAB.
The aircraft is at 1000 feet AGL and is extremely high on
the approach with all four Precision Approach Path
Indicator lights indicating that the aircraft is higher than
the standard approach path. The pilot attempts to recover
by pitching the aircraft down which leads to an increase
in airspeed. The pilot is approaching the runway at
100 knots (35 knots above the prescribed approach speed)
at 250 feet AGL.
4) Based on your lived experiences, how would you
determine your go-around decision?
Follow-up: Explain in detail your thought process
(e.g., altitude, etc.)
5) What risks do you perceive if one were to continue the
approach?
6) Describe the factors that influenced your decisionmaking to command a go-around.
Scenario 3
The aircraft is approaching Runway 16 at KDAB. The
aircraft is at 1000 feet AGL and is experiencing a 20 knots
crosswind from the left. The pilot utilized faulty crosswind
correction technique is deviating off the lateral approach
path. The pilot is recovering by banking the aircraft up to
20 degrees at 200 feet.
7) Based on your lived experiences, how would you
determine your go-around decision?
Follow-up: Explain in detail your thought process (e.g.,
altitude, etc.)
8) What risks do you perceive if one were to continue the
approach?
9) Describe the factors that influenced your decisionmaking to command a go-around.
Open-Ended Questionnaire
10) Please describe the concept of a stabilized an
approach.
11) How do you perceive having a co-pilot/flight
instructor could influence your perceptions of risks
associated with continuing an unstabilized approach?
12) What techniques would you use to attempt ‘‘saving’’
the landing?
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Procedures
This research used a purely qualitative approach to
understand the risk perception and the decision-making
skills of collegiate aviation pilots related to unstabilized
approaches based on their lived experiences. The use of a
phenomenology methodology enabled the researchers to
bring forth into consciousness preconceived ideas about
unstabilized approaches and then set them aside (Creswell,
2013; Moustakas, 1994). According to Conklin (2014),
phenomenology aspires to dive into the personal and
individual perceptions within themes. Furthermore, this
methodology enabled researchers to access knowledge that
is particular, a kind of knowledge that offers insight into
idiosyncrasy. Therefore, by accessing this knowledge,
researchers were able to study individuals’ insights and
interpretations of their lived experiences, which cannot
otherwise be accessed. However, Moustakas (1994) strongly
suggests bracketing out the researchers’ feelings and
opinions through the data analysis so that the findings are
limited to the themes that emerged from the participants’
experiences. Individual interviews were the primary data
source, but additional data were retrieved from a short
qualitative questionnaire to gain further information based on
the scenarios presented and to achieve triangulation of the
data. The researchers followed Patton’s (2015) interview
guidelines to ‘‘ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry
[were] pursued with each person interviewed’’ (p. 439).
One of the main advantages of Patton’s (2015) interview
guides is that they enabled the researchers to interview all
participants in a systematic and comprehensive manner
that delimited the issues to be explored in advance. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed for accuracy.
The participants were presented with three video-recorded
scenarios to evaluate. A short qualitative questionnaire
was used to understand how their perceptions play a role
in determining an unstabilized approach. Once the data
were collected and transcribed, they was sent to the
participants for review and accuracy assurance.
Data Analysis
While several data analysis methods could be used to
obtain a clear understanding of the phenomenon in
question, bracketing, phenomenological reduction, and
composite textural and structural descriptions were the
most appropriate data analysis procedures for this study to
ensure the essence of the experience of the participants is
truly captured. Moustakas (1994) defines bracketing as
being transparent with ourselves ‘‘to allow whatever is
before us in consciousness to disclose itself’’ so that the
researcher can view context through a different lens with an
open mind (p. 86). Therefore, researchers had to bracket
their thoughts with an open mindset to focus on the
participants’ lived experiences. To assist in successfully
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bracketing ideas, the researchers kept reflective notes to help
uphold transparency and reduce research bias. According to
Creswell (2013), this process allows researchers to discard
preconceived perspectives and achieve confirmability.
Following Moustakas’s (1994) data analysis steps,
phenomenological reduction enabled the researchers to
describe the participants’ textural language and meaning.
The researchers’ job was to continuously look for textural
attributes and descriptions within the data related to
the phenomenon with an experiential reference. Lastly,
because the phenomenon in question happened in a specific
time and place, composite and structural descriptions
provided a ‘‘unified statement of essences of the experience
of the phenomenon as a whole’’ (Moustakas, 1994, p. 100).
Because all interviews were transcribed, open coding was
used to create categories around the core phenomenon
(Creswell, 2013). Furthermore, axial coding was used to
relate themes to the core phenomenon. Axial coding
assisted with the confirmation of the themes represented
from the data collected and created a more exact
identification of the essential components (Conklin, 2014;
Creswell, 2013).
Findings
To address the research questions, information collected
from individual interviews was analyzed and triangulated
with the use of a qualitative questionnaire. As code began
to saturate, themes began to emerge from the data,
expressing how the participants’ lived experiences related
to the risk perception and the decision-making skills
towards unstabilized approaches. There were three major
themes that emerged from the data: (a) internal perceptions,
(b) external pressures, and (c) unique worldview.
Theme 1: Internal Perceptions
Internal perception is the first major theme that emerged
from the findings. Internal perception refers to the
participants’ insights and observations, towards a flight
instructor or an additional crewmember, during a visual
approach and landing. The findings supported that
participants’ internal perception affects their risk and safety
discernment during a visual approach and landing. As a
result, participants were willing to accept a higher-thannormal level of risk. These findings have theoretical
implications as they validate the theory that people
compare the amount of risk perceived with their target
level of risk and, as an attempt to eliminate the discrepancy
between the observed and desired level of risk, individuals
will adjust their behavior (Wilde, 1998).
In this study, the participants revealed that their
willingness to continue an unstabilized approach was
influenced by their internal perceptions of a flight instructor
or crewmember. Participants were tolerating a higher level

of risk (continuing an unstabilized approach) by relying on
the other crewmember’s experience and contributions
during the approach phase. For example, one participant
expressed, ‘‘I feel that I’m at a lot less risk with another
copilot or flight instructor on board and I’m most likely
going to continue the approach lower than I would if I was
just by myself. I’m going to go around sooner [sic] rather
than I am fine [sic] with another flight instructor or
someone I know then I’ll be more comfortable continuing
lower on approach, even if it is unstabilized.’’ Another
participant synthesized this notion when sharing their
experiences in unstabilized approaches, ‘‘I ask myself if my
instructor will support me. Are they going to back me up or
will they going to question me or ridicule me?’’ Though
they expressed hesitation, participants’ actions correlate
with Wilde’s (1998) theory of risk compensation as they
used the instructor’s experience and contributions as a
safety feature and were inclined to adopt a riskier behavior
and continue the unstabilized approach. Another participant
expressed, ‘‘[flight instructors] have enough hours, and
been through enough to where they probably understand [if
an approach] is stable or very unstable.’’ Other participants
communicated that having an additional crewmember is
perceived as an increased level of safety which influenced
their perceived level of risks. For example, one participant
stated, ‘‘I think it definitely helps. I mean, two people
behind the controls is a lot safer than one, you have a
second set of eyes to watch for a host of you know, good or
bad things that you can notice. So, I’d say it influences a
pilot in a good way to have a second set of eyes.’’ The
findings validate the risk compensation theory since
participants perceived that being on board with a flight
instructor or an additional crewmember influenced their
decisions to continue an approach and to accept a higher
level of risk. Consequently, participants were adopting a
riskier behavior due to the perception that an additional
crewmember compensates for a high level of risk.
In relation to aviation safety, recognizing individual
thinking practices and the decision-making process can be
closely related to analytical modes. Based on the findings,
internal perception contributes to a pilot’s rationality to
choose among alternatives based on how they are
perceived. The sense of being judged that all participants
expressed shows empirical implications as these mental
models used to judge risks are ‘‘constantly moderated’’
which can include reinforcement, modifications, amplification, or attenuation (Wachinger et al., 2013, p. 1049).
Evidently, internal perception is the number one factor
contributing to the negative impact of external pressures.
Theme 2: External Pressures
Aside from internal perceptions, particularly hesitation,
the second theme that emerged from the data was external
pressures. Participants in this study felt that external
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pressures, such as due-back times and low altitudes,
influenced their perceptions and decision-making process
related to unstabilized approaches. One participant
expressed, ‘‘[although] we have tight tolerances at low
altitudes, I find myself saving the landing especially when
faced with an operational pressure like due back times.’’
Most participants felt that relying on confidence, even if
the actions taken are not procedurally correct, enables
them to ‘‘save the landing’’ to meet external pressures.
There are two empirical implications in which external
pressures seem to interfere with the decision-making
process in an unstable approach situation: perception of
risk and situation awareness. While the risk perception
process is influenced by a person’s surroundings, mental
state, and personal background amongst a range of other
factors (Brown, 2014), the data from this study validate
that both mental state and the surroundings directly
interfere in how an unstabilized approach is judged.
On the other hand, participants perceived low altitudes as
an external pressure that influenced their decision to reject a
landing. The majority of the participants agreed that safety
margins ‘‘tightened’’ as altitude decreases in an approach to
land. However, though safety margins decrease, participants from this study seem to let external pressure influence
their rationale when they are judging an unstabilized
approach. The participants’ lived experiences validate the
theoretical implication that if the perception of risk stays
the same, the motivation to change behavior will also stay
the same (Wilde, 1998).
Theme 3: Unique Worldview
The last theme that emerged from the data was a sense of
unique worldview. The participants in this study acknowledge numerous factors perceived as a risk (e.g., hard
landings, flap overspeed, stalls), though they are willing to
overlook them in an effort to correct an unstabilized
approach. For example, one participant noted that an
unstabilized approach would lead to ‘‘damage [of] the
breaks, airframe, and wheels. [Even] stalling a few hundred
feet before the runway’’ if proper corrections are not made.
Another participant shared that in their experience,
‘‘forcing an approach lead to overshooting the runway,
[a] hard landing or potentially worse.’’ These statements
validate the claims by Blajev and Curtis (2017) that pilots
consider executing the go-around maneuver as risky due to
the lack of experience of executing go-arounds and the goaround maneuver is a rare maneuver for many pilots, which
gives rise to fear for executing the maneuver.
As noted in past studies, Elston (2019) explained how
cognitive bias allows us to focus on information that our
brain perceives to be important and dampen input that is
not perceived to be important. Data from this study show
how participants are willing to give in to internal
perceptions and external pressures, and, in turn, fall into
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complacency. For example, in a final approach scenario
with Vapp significantly higher than calculated, participants recognized the ‘‘potential for overspending and
damaging the flaps.’’ Nevertheless, they are all collectively willing to save the landing as ‘‘there are less options
and a higher risk if executing a go-around too late.’’ The
data further showed how their sense of complacency was
directly tied to their worldview of risk and tolerances.
Participants are ‘‘willing to take a higher risk due to
tighter tolerances’’ at lower altitudes. The high sense of
complacency found in the participants’ lived experiences
has significant theoretical implications. This notion of a
high sense of complacency validates Hunter’s (2002)
claims that pilots with a low perception of risk tend to be
involved in more hazardous events. Evidently, individuals’ unique worldview could lead to unnecessary
exposure to hazardous aviation events.
Limitations
There are multiple variations in how a phenomenological
study is conducted (Patton, 2015). However, although
generalizability cannot be achieved with the use of a small
sample or a single site, the power of this qualitative research
was strengthened with the use of purposeful sampling to
derive information-rich cases. While the findings address the
identified gap in the literature and are rooted in Wilde’s
(1998) theory of compensation, qualitative research data
strive to describe, ‘‘capture and communicate someone else’s
experience of the world in his or her own words’’ (Patton,
2015, p. 54).
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to conduct a detailed
qualitative phenomenological analysis of the risk perceptions and decision-making model of collegiate aviation
pilots for unstabilized approaches. The findings of this
study highlighted the lack of objective stabilized approach
criteria. IATA (2016) authenticated the notion of stabilized
criteria with the recommendation of more objective-driven
stabilization criteria for pilots to assist their decisionmaking to execute a go-around. These parameters need to
be standardized in a flight training environment that
ensures an easy transition when pilots receive instruction
or operate with different pilots or instructors. Further
research is required for developing standardized and
objective stabilization criteria that can be accepted by the
general aviation community. Perhaps it will be useful to
conduct further research to root the definition of aviation
skills in situation awareness. Moreover, this study’s
findings highlighted the need for the development of
training aids that are focused on training pilots for
identifying unstabilized approaches. While there is a
variety of flight training devices, commonly referred to as
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flight training simulators, there is a need for the development of objective-driven visual training aids integrated with
flight training device scenarios that would help pilots in the
recognition of unstabilized approaches.
The factors associated with internal perceptions and
external pressures suggested that students are prone to
complacency. Although participants acknowledged many
factors being perceived as risks (e.g., hard landings, flap
overspeed, stalls), they are willing to overlook these factors
to save an unstabilized approach based on their unique
worldview. Despite the risks associated with an unstabilized approach, students are inclined to adopt a higher level
of risk to compensate for adverse repercussions, including
arriving late. The influence of mental and environmental
factors impairing participants’ judgement of an unstabilized
approach validates the principles of the risk compensation
theory. As a result, flight schools should consider the
development of a one-day landing clinic delivered to
every student. The one-day landing clinic could consist of
analyzing students’ internal decision-making process
through continuous assessment of students’ risk perception at different stages of the approach.
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